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RESUMEN 
 
Los programas de pensiones latinoamericanos tienen baja cobertura. Utilizando 
paneles de registros administrativos de Argentina, Chile y Uruguay, 
caracterizamos las historias de contribución de la población. Construimos tres 
indicadores: densidad de cotización, tasas de transición y duración de los 
períodos de contribución y no contribución. Los datos obtenidos son 
preocupantes. La densidad de cotización promedio es baja y bastante 
heterogénea a través de la población. Los períodos de contribución son cortos y 
las interrupciones frecuentes. Las tasas de transición son altas a edades 
tempranas y tienden a caer a lo largo de la vida, indicando gran rotación entre 
los jóvenes.  
Clasificación JEL: H55, J14, J26 
Palabras Clave: Densidad de cotización, historia laboral, pensiones. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Pension programs in Latin America have low coverage. We use large panel 
databases coming from administrative records of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay 
to characterize the histories of contribution of the population. We compute 
three indicators: density of contribution, transition rates and duration of the 
spells of contribution and no contribution. The picture that emerges is 
worrisome. The density of contributions is low on average and pretty 
heterogeneous across the population. The spells of contribution are short and 
interruptions are frequent. Transition rates are higher at early ages and tend to 
decline later in life, indicating high turnover among young individuals.  
JEL Classification: H55, J14, J26 
Keywords: Density of contributions, pensions, work history. 
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL SECURITY IN ARGENTINA, CHILE 
AND URUGUAY: DENSITIES, TRANSITIONS AND DURATION 
 
ALVARO FORTEZA, IGNACIO APELLA,  
EDUARDO FAJNZYLBER, CARLOS GRUSHKA, IANINA ROSSI AND 
GRACIELA SANROMÁN1 
I. Introduction 
One of the main flaws of pension systems in most developing countries is 
their inability to cover all the population (Gill, et al 2003; Holzmann and Hinz, 
2005; Forteza et al. 2009a). In Latin America, social security coverage is not 
only low but it also does not show clear signs of improvement (Rofman et al. 
2008b). Furthermore, in recent years, several scholars have shown that most 
participants in contributory pension programs in Latin America are only 
partially covered, in the sense that they actively contribute only a small part of 
the time they are supposed to contribute, so they are not fully eligible to receive 
social security benefits (see, among others, Bertranou and Sánchez, 2003; De 
Biase and Grushka, 2003; Lagomarsino and Lanzilotta, 2004; Berstein et al 
2006; Bucheli et al. 2008). In the present paper, we use individual records of 
social security programs in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay to provide a 
comparative analysis of contribution histories in these three countries. 
The individual records of contribution are a key component of the reforms 
that introduced individual savings accounts to the pension schemes in Latin 
America. Yet, their ability to make the system more transparent and in so 
doing, to better-protect the working poor in old age is neither widely known 
nor fully understood.  
                                                 
1 Alvaro Forteza (Alvarof@decon.edu.uy, corresponding author: Departamento de Economía, 
Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Constituyente 1502 piso 6 cp 11200, Montevideo, Uruguay), 
Ianina Rossi (Ianina@decon.edu.uy) and Graciela Sanromán (Gsanroman@decon.edu.uy) are 
researchers at the Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la 
República, Uruguay. Eduardo Fajnzylber is assistant professor at the School of Government of 
the Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Chile. The article was prepared while Mr. Fajnzylber was Head 
of the Research Department of the Studies Division at the Chilean Pension Supervising Authority 
(Superintendencia de Pensiones). Ignacio Apella (Ignacioa@cedes.org) is researcher at the 
Center for the Study of State and Society (CEDES), Argentina. Carlos Grushka 
(cgrushka@SAFJP.gov.ar) is with the Superintendency of AFJP, Argentina. Eduardo Fajnzylber 
wishes to thank the excellent research assistance of Isabel Poblete. 
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In Argentina and Uruguay before the reforms, the main social security 
program administrations had almost no record of individual contributions and 
could not check whether workers had accumulated the years of contribution 
legally required to access a pension. Benefits were hence granted on a very 
informal basis, often appealing to the testimony of witnesses. Not surprisingly, 
many people managed to receive a contributory pension even when they had 
not contributed the required number of years. In the Chilean case, even if 
individual records were available before the 1980 reform, they were distributed 
among a number of different institutions with heterogeneous contents, formats 
and integrity. 
Systems are gradually being built to populate work history records and 
administrators are increasingly gaining the capacity to authenticate individual 
records of contribution. Nevertheless, as the region advances fiscally, a large 
portion of workers risk not adapting to the new conditions and ending up with a 
very low pension or no pension at all. 
In this paper, we characterize the empirical distributions of the densities of 
contribution, the duration of the spells of contribution and no contribution and 
the transitions into and out of contributing in the main social security programs 
in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. We compute not only average densities but 
also how densities vary with several characteristics of the individuals. This is 
important because of the significant heterogeneity that can be identified across 
the population. Densities of contribution do not provide information about the 
dynamics of social security coverage though. We shed some light on the 
dynamics of the process computing the duration of the spells of contribution 
and no contribution and the rates of transition between these two states. As in 
the case of densities, we characterize the empirical distribution of the spells. So 
we provide a picture of the average densities of contributions and the frequency 
of interruptions. By applying the same methodology and using the same type of 
data in the three countries we are in a position to compare these countries. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first comparative study of this topic.  
In the next section we briefly describe the social security programs in terms 
of both design and a few aggregate statistics. In section three we describe the 
datasets and in section 4 we present our empirical analysis. Section 5 
concludes. 
ECONÓMICA 
 
130
II. Institutional Organization of Social Security and Aggregate Statistics 
A. Design of social security  
Pension programs in the region have undergone profound reforms in recent 
decades. Chile led the introduction of mandatory individual savings account in 
1981. The traditional defined-benefit pay-as-you-go program (DB-PAYG) was 
phased out. Argentina and Uruguay followed in the nineties introducing mixed 
programs that combined traditional DB-PAYG and savings accounts. The three 
countries introduced new changes in recent years. Chile and Uruguay 
maintained the basic architecture, but introduced a series of adjustments –wider 
and more ambitious in the Chilean than in the Uruguayan case- mostly geared 
to strengthening social protection. Argentina was more radical, and in 2008 
eliminated the individual savings accounts.  
1. Argentinean system 
The enactment of Law No. 24241 in 1994 created the Sistema Integrado de 
Jubilaciones y Pensiones (SIJP) (Integrated Pension System). The SIJP 
included two regimes: one public, financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis 
and managed by the Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social (ANSES) 
(National Administration of Social Security), and the other based on individual 
capitalization managed by private companies (AFJP).2 
In exchange for managing the workers’ mandatory savings, the AFJPs 
received a fee proportional to the workers’ wage. All workers older than 18 
years had to contribute to the SIJP, but they had the option of choosing 
between the traditional PAYG and the individual capitalization regime. In 
addition, the parameters were gradually adjusted. The minimum retirement age 
was increased from 55 to 60 years for women and from 60 to 65 years for men. 
The minimum number of years required to access a pension was increased from 
20 to 30 years. 
The newly designed scheme was (partially) financed by an individual 
contribution equivalent to 11 percent of employee income (or presumed income 
for the self-employed) and an employer contribution of 16 percent. The public 
segment was financed by a series of specific resources drawn from general tax 
revenues.  
                                                 
2 Except for one firm, Nación AFJP, managed by the Banco de la Nación Argentina. 
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The Argentinean pension system has two tiers. The first tier consists of a 
flat benefit granted to all who are insured and meet the required age and years 
of contribution. This benefit, called the Prestación Básica Universal (PBU), is 
administered by ANSES. The second pillar depends on the exercised option 
(i.e., the regime chosen). The PAYG regime grants an additional benefit, called 
the Prestación Adicional por Permanencia (PAP), equivalent to 0.015 times 
the average wage of the last 10 years per every year contributed to the public 
regime after 1994. The capitalization regime grants an annuity, called the 
Jubilación Ordinaria (JO), based on the accumulated balance. Workers who 
made contributions before 1994 are entitled to the Prestación Compensatoria 
(PC), which is a compensatory benefit computed like the PAP. The PC, like the 
PBU, is independent of the regime chosen by the affiliate. 
Without yet changing the basic architectural design, the system was 
amended several times between 2003 and 2007.  Affiliates to private pension 
funds were allowed to switch back to the PAYG pillar; the DB substituted the 
DC pillar as the default option for new affiliates; individuals with the minimum 
retirement age but insufficient contributions were allowed to credit unpaid past 
periods of contributions as self-employed with generous facilities to pay the 
emerging debt3; benefits paid by the PAYG pillar were increased; and the fees 
of the AFJP were tapped. In 2008, a more radical reform began, when the 
Argentinean government passed a law that eliminated the individual accounts 
pillar. Affiliates to the APFJP were transferred with their funds to the public 
pillar, so that ANSES administers now the whole system. 
2. Chilean System 
The current Chilean pension system can be deconstructed into three main 
pillars: a poverty prevention pillar, a contributory pillar and a voluntary pillar. 
The poverty prevention pillar, before the 2008 reform, was based on two 
components:  an assistance pension (the Pensión Asistencial or PASIS) and the 
minimum pension guarantee (MPG). PASIS is a non-contributory means-tested 
                                                 
3 This procedure, baptized as moratoria, was probably the most important of these reforms in 
terms of the short run impact it had on elderly coverage and in terms of fiscal costs. Rofman et 
al. (2008a) cite Bodou et al. (2007) who estimate that because of the moratoria coverage among 
the elderly grew from 69 percent in 2006 to 85 percent in 2007. Public spending grew in 2007 
about 1.75 percentage points of GDP, most of which can be ascribed to the moratoria, according 
to Rofman et al. (2008a).  
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benefit. The MPG is a minimum contributory pension for individuals who 
contributed for at least 20 years to the individual capitalization scheme but 
were not able to finance a minimum amount for retirement. Together, these two 
programs corresponded to the main government policies aimed at avoiding old-
age poverty, and were financed by general revenue. The reform of 2008 
replaced these two programs with the New Solidarity Pillar (NSP), providing 
(i) a basic pension to the 60 percent poorest with no contribution and (ii) a 
supplement to the 60 percent poorest that self-finance a small pension. For 
individuals over a certain age, a provision of the reform ensured the option to 
choose between the MPG and the NSP.4 
The contributory pillar, previously based on a dispersed number of PAYG 
schemes, was drastically reformed in 1980 to create a unique national scheme 
that is based on individual accounts managed by professional firms, the 
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs).5 Funds cannot be withdrawn 
until retirement, meaning any point after the legal retirement age (65 years for 
men and 60 for women) or in early retirement if they have accumulated 
sufficient funds in their account and they receive a minimum replacement rate. 
Upon retirement, the individual can choose between buying an annuity from an 
insurance company and receiving a programmed withdrawal stream from the 
AFP (or different combinations of these two options). In both cases, benefits 
are actuarially calculated as a function of the individual’s lifetime accumulated 
savings, the potential beneficiaries and (age- and gender-specific) life 
expectancy.6  
                                                 
4 See Rofman et al. (2008a) for a detailed description of the 2008 Chilean reform. 
5 Only the armed forces, military and police remained in their previous PAYG schemes. 
6 To be more precise, pension under the Chilean scheme are calculated by dividing the current 
balance of the individual (which includes lifetime savings and financial returns, together with the 
current value of recognition bonds and voluntary contributions) by the sum of “unitary necessary 
capitals” of the retiree and his/her potential beneficiaries: husband or wife, a parent of a common 
child, children under the age of 18, 24 if they are studying or of any age if they are disabled and 
in some cases the parents of the retiree. The unitary necessary capitals correspond to the 
resources required to finance the net present value of a stream of pensions equivalent to 1 unit of 
account, discounting each payment by the probability of having to make that payment (the 
probability that the retiree will be alive by that age or that the beneficiaries will outlive the 
retiree). A detailed description of the current AFP system can be found, in Spanish, in Berstein 
(2010), with an earlier English version available in the English section of www.spensiones.cl. A 
number of articles have been written about the impact the 1980 Chilean pension reform may 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL SECURITY IN ARGENTINA, CHILE… 
 
133
To complement the compulsory savings made in the contributory scheme, 
tax incentives are provided for individuals to make additional voluntary 
contributions in a wide set of financial products. 
3. Uruguayan System 
The first old-age, survival and disability (OASDI) insurance programs were 
set up in the 19th century in Uruguay. These programs expanded their coverage 
and scope in the following decades, becoming almost universal in the 1950s. In 
1967, a public institution called Banco de Previsión Social (BPS) was created 
to administer the social security system. Since then, BPS has administered the 
largest retirement programs in the country, covering public servants, private 
workers (with some exceptions), rural workers and domestic workers. Some 
categories of workers have their own special pension schemes: bank 
employees, notaries, self-employed university graduates, armed forces 
personnel and police force personnel. Contributors to the BPS represented 89 
percent of the total number of contributors to all social security institutions in 
the country in 2001 (Ferreira-Coimbra and Forteza 2004). 
Before the social security reform initiated in 1996, the BPS retirement 
programs were financed on a PAYG basis through payroll contributions paid 
by employers and employees and transfers from the central government. 
Contribution was also mandatory for self-employed workers, who were subject 
to minimum declared earnings. The 1996 reform modified the main parameters 
of the BPS programs and introduced an individual savings accounts pillar 
administered by private firms.  
As a general rule, workers whose earnings are below a threshold are 
exclusively affiliated to the PAYG pillar. However, they can opt to deposit half 
of their personal contributions into individual savings accounts. Workers whose 
earnings are over this threshold must contribute to both pillars. For the amount 
below the threshold, they contribute to the PAYG public system and from there 
up to a certain ceiling, also established by law, they must contribute to 
individual accounts. There is no mandatory contribution for earnings over the 
established maximum. Employer contributions go exclusively to the PAYG 
pillar. 
                                                                                                                      
have had on social security coverage, financial development, national savings and economic 
performance. For instance, see Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003). 
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The minimum retirement age was fixed at 60 for men and women, which 
meant an increase of five years for the latter. Also, the minimum number of 
years of contribution required to access an ordinary pension was raised from 30 
to 35. These two requirements were initially the same for the two pillars, but in 
2001 a partial reform allowed workers aged 65 years or more to stop 
contributing to the savings accounts pillar and receive an annuity, regardless of 
their count of years of contribution. Workers can receive a special “advanced-
age” pension served by the solidarity pillar (jubilación por edad avanzada). 
Eligibility for this program was restricted to individuals who are 70 years old 
or above and have contributed no less than 15 years. Workers with hazardous 
occupations and other special categories have a special bonus added to the 
count of years of contribution. 
The replacement rate was also modified in the 1996 reform, making it more 
sensitive to both the retirement age and years of contribution, in order to induce 
longer working-lives. The replacement rate was set equal for both genders, 
ranging from 50 to 82.5 percent, depending on the years of contribution and the 
retirement age. The average wage used in the benefit formula was modified to 
include a longer period of contribution. In addition, there is an extra bonus for 
low-income workers who choose to contribute to individual savings accounts. 
It is worth noting that contributors are also entitled to unemployment 
insurance, a disability pension, sickness and maternity subsidies, family 
allowances and health care. In all these programs, benefits are conditioned on 
compliance with eligibility requirements and as a general rule, the self-
employed receive fewer benefits.  
This system is financed by employer—employee payroll contributions and 
general taxes. In the 1996 reform, employee contributions were set at 18 
percent of monthly earnings, while employer contributions were set at 17.5 
percent of total payroll. Over the years, the government introduced exemptions 
to employer contributions and in 2007, in the context of a tax reform, some of 
the exemptions were lifted and the general employer contribution rate for social 
security was reduced to 12.5 percent. Self-employed contributions are based on 
a minimum declared monthly income. 
Workers who do not contribute may access means-tested benefits: an 
assistance pension for persons older than 70 years old, family allowances and 
free health care in the public system.  
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In 2008 a law was passed that loosened the eligibility conditions for 
contributory pensions. In the ordinary pension program, the number of years of 
contribution required to access a pension was reduced to 30, i.e. to the pre-1996 
reform figure. Lower replacement rates were settled for workers with shorter 
histories of contributions, with a minimum at 45 percent. In the “advanced-age” 
old-age program, the minimum eligibility age was reduced from 70 to 65. 
Workers claiming this benefit at 65 must have contributed at least 25 years. 
This figure is reduced in 2 years per year of postponement of retirement up to 
70, when workers may receive the benefit with 15 years of contribution.   
B. Aggregate statistics  
The size of the pension system measured by the expenditure in pensions as a 
percentage of GDP varies widely in these three countries. In 2006, it ranged 
from 3 percent in Chile to almost 11 percent in Uruguay (Table 1). By Latin 
American standards, coverage of the elderly is comparatively large in the three 
countries, particularly so in the case of Uruguay. Coverage of the labor force 
was in 2006 in the order of 60 percent in Chile and Uruguay, and 40 percent in 
Argentina. In the same year, the average pension represented roughly half of 
per capita GDP in Argentina, 44 percent in Uruguay and about one third of per 
capita GDP in Chile. 
Since the early nineties, no noticeable improvement in the coverage of the 
labor force has occurred in any of the three countries (Figure 1). Furthermore, 
coverage experienced a decline in Argentina and Uruguay between 1992 and 
2002-3 and only in recent years has there been some recovery, partially 
explained by the business cycle. In Chile, coverage of the labor force has 
remained virtually stagnant. 
III. Work History Records  
A. Argentinean data  
Our sample comes from the Labor Histories Database built by the National 
Direction of Social Security Policies (DNPSS) of the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security. In the past, the database was used only partially for labor and 
social security research (Bertranou and Sánchez 2003; De Biase and Grushka 
2003; DNPSS 2003). 
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The SIJP information is based on (i) the sworn statements (Declaración 
Jurada) of employers that are required before depositing the social security 
contributions of employees and (ii) payments made by the self-employed 
(independent and monotributistas workers).7 
As in other countries, the work history records in Argentina were designed 
taking into account only the immediate operational needs of the social security 
administration. Because of this, the records are relatively poor in terms of 
socio-demographic information (DNPSS 2003). Nevertheless, the database 
provides some basic information about all those who contributed to the SIJP. 
The original database includes sworn statements covering a 90-month period 
between July 1994 and December 2001, following more than 8 million workers 
(or affiliates) who made at least one contribution to the SIJP since 1994. Of this 
population, the Social Security Secretariat randomly selected a sample of 
10,000 registered workers who were still alive and active in December 2001.8 
Pension rights are based on employer statements, not actual contributions. 
To organize the data, the following matrix was established: a Unique Code of 
Tax or Labor Identification (CUIT/L) associated the record to a worker; one 
row was introduced for each worker, equaling 10,000 rows; and, a column 
represented one month, thus 90 columns. To designate a contribution made 
within a given month, a “1” populated the respective cell; if no contribution 
was made, a “0” was entered. Hence, the sum across a row determines the 
worker’s accumulated contributions in the window of observation. The 
database also contains some information regarding characteristics of the 
individuals: age, type of worker (classified into three categories: employee, 
self-employed and mixed), taxable income, pensions regime (PAYG or 
capitalization) and jurisdiction of residence. This data is available only in 
December 2001, so the database is cross-section regarding these variables.  
B. Chilean data 
We had access to the Base de Historias Previsionales de Afiliados Activos, 
Pensionados y Fallecidos  (Affiliates Pension Histories database, HPA), 
                                                 
7 The monotributo is a simplified regime. The contributions in this regime go entirely to the 
public program. 
8 Unfortunately, this sampling procedure may introduce some biases linked to attrition: workers 
who are not captured in the sample because of death or inactivity are likely to differ from the 
captured workers. 
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populated with individual contribution records, for a representative sample of 
participants (representative of all participants in 2001) in the pension system 
from 1981 to 2006.9  The HPA includes the complete contribution history (in 
the AFP system) for a sample of approximately 24,000 individuals, 
representative of the stock of active affiliates, retirees and deceased affiliates of 
the system in July 2001.10 In addition, the dataset also includes information on 
the recognition bonds held by the sampled individuals.11 
C. Uruguayan data 
We used a random sample of the work history records collected in December 
2004 by the Unidad de Historia Laboral  (Labor History Unit) of the Banco de 
Previsión Social (ATYR-BPS). Workers in the sample contributed at least one 
month between April 1996 and December 2004. The sample has almost 70,000 
individuals.  
The records are organized in five databases. The first database provides 
personal information: date of birth, sex and country of birth. Job profiles 
comprise the second, particularly the date of initiation of activity and the 
explicit end of the link between the worker and the firm. A third reports 
monthly information about the contributions, wages and some characteristics of 
the job. A separate database contains information about benefits, including the 
date of retirement. Finally, the fifth database contains information about 
contributions sent to administrators of pension funds (AFAP). 
Like the Chilean records of work histories, these databases provide detailed 
information about monthly contributions to social security, gender, age, and 
sector of activity. Unfortunately, we do not yet have a survey of socio-
economic characteristics of contributors to social security for Uruguay. Hence, 
                                                 
9 The sample was originally drawn as the basis for the Social Protection Survey, a panel 
instrument that was taken in 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 for a large fraction of the individuals in 
the sample. The Social Protection Survey was inspired by the American Health and Retirement 
Survey. For more information on the Chilean version, see www.proteccionsocial.cl. 
10 Upon initial contribution, the individual is considered an “affiliate”. 
11 The recognition bonds are obligations assumed by the State to those individuals who 
contributed to the earlier PAYG system but then switched to the AFP scheme. They are 
calculated as a function of the contributions made to their previous regime (number, timing and 
covered wages) and they earn a 4 per cent annual real interest rate until the person reaches the 
minimum retirement age (60 for women, 65 for men). At that point the State deposits the value 
of the bond in the individual account. 
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we lack some important socio-economic characteristics like education and 
characteristics of the families. However, it is worth noticing that the availability 
of a longitudinal sample with many time periods allows us to estimate the 
effect of time invariant characteristics in a parsimonious way. 
IV. Densities of contribution, durations and transitions  
A. Densities 
The density of contribution is the ratio of the count of effective to potential 
months of contribution. The individual must be alive, not retired (though not 
necessarily active) and no younger than 18 years old for a month to be 
considered as a potential month of contribution.  
The average densities of contribution in the windows of observation are 56, 
51 and 60 percent in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay respectively (Table 2). The 
median contribution densities are a bit higher. So a typical affiliate to these 
social security programs contributes no much more than half of the time. When 
he turned 60, he would have contributed on average 23, 22 and 25 years, in 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay respectively.  
Individuals in the three databases show considerable diversity regarding 
densities of contribution (Figure 2). The Argentinean and to a lesser extent the 
Uruguayan sample present strongly asymmetric and bimodal distributions for 
both men and women, with the two modes close to zero and one. A similar 
pattern emerges among Chilean women, but men show a monotonically 
increasing distribution with a large mode at 100 percent. Similar patterns have 
been reported in previous studies (see among others, De Biase and Grushka 
2003; Farall et al. 2003; Bertranou and Sánchez 2003; Bucheli et al. 2008; 
Lagomarsino and Lanzilotta, 2004; Bravo et al. 2006; Berstein et al. 200612).   
In Argentina and Uruguay, men and women present similar contribution 
densities (Table 2). In Chile, men have considerably higher contribution 
densities than women. This is consistent with the level of labor force 
participation among Chilean women, considered relatively low for the region, 
given the economic development level of the country. 
                                                 
12 Arenas et al. (2006) find a bimodal distribution for Chilean men as well, but they work with 
survey data. 
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Densities are particularly low at early ages (Table 3). Average densities at 
20 range between 30 in Chile and 39 percent in Uruguay. As expected, 
densities increase as workers mature and, in the three countries, mature workers 
contribute in the order of twice as much as they contribute when they are in 
their early twenties. 
Densities of contribution negatively correlate with income levels (Table 4). 
In order to avoid the circular reasoning of finding low densities for workers 
whose low average income is due to a few periods of contribution, we 
calculated the average earnings over periods in which individuals reported 
strictly positive earnings.13 We found consistently higher densities of 
contribution in higher income quintiles. In Argentina and Uruguay, workers in 
the poorest quintile contribute about two thirds of the time workers in the 
richest quintile do. This gap is even bigger in Chile. 
Densities have evolved differently in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay and 
among sexes in the periods we could observe.  The comparison should be made 
with some caution, for the periods covered by our databases differ and the 
macroeconomic conditions in the three countries were not the same in these 
periods. As expected, the business cycle seems to have impacted on 
contribution densities in the three countries (Figure 3). Years in which the 
unemployment rate was high exhibit comparatively low densities. But in the 
case of Chile there is a positive trend in contribution densities, particularly 
among women, that seems to go beyond the short run fluctuations. In turn, the 
fall in contribution densities of Argentinean men might also respond to other 
factors apart from the cycle. More data will be needed to formally separate 
trends from short run fluctuations, though. 
There are small differences between the two pillars of the Argentinean 
mixed system, as the affiliated to the individual accounts pillar contributed 55 
percent on average and the affiliated to the PAYG pillar contributed 57 percent.  
                                                 
13 In the cases of Chile and Uruguay, we used the estimated individual effects of labor income 
equations, rather than labor income itself, to compute income quintiles (see Forteza et al. 2009b). 
These effects are meant to capture some permanent characteristics of individuals, mainly 
education and skills.  The quintiles were then constructed within groups defined by cohort and 
gender. Cohorts in the Argentinean and Uruguayan cases were constructed by 5-years intervals 
according to the year of birth. In the Chilean case, they correspond to the year of birth. 
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Only in the case of Argentina could we distinguish between dependent and 
self-employed workers. Average densities were 68 and 62 percent among 
dependent and self-employed workers, respectively.  
In the case of Uruguay, we could distinguish between public and private 
sector workers. As expected, public sector workers have significantly higher 
densities of contribution than private sector workers.14 While public workers 
contributed about 86 percent of the time, private sector workers contributed 
about 58 percent of the time. Contributions spanning the entire period ranged 
from 67 percent for public employees to 22 percent for private employees. A 
considerable number of individuals classified as public employees, 
nevertheless, present low densities of contribution. This is partly because 
workers classified as public employees may actually spend as much as half of 
their working life as private employees. Also several groups of public workers 
have special regimes by which they compute more than one year of 
contribution per year of effective contribution (teachers, workers handling 
radioactive products, etc.), so they need less periods of contribution to access a 
pension. 
B. Duration 
Durations should be analyzed with caution, for there is significant censoring 
of the spells in the social security databases. Many spells have already begun 
when we first observe them and many others have not finished yet when we 
cease to observe them, either because the window of observation is closed or 
because the individual is no longer observed. In this paper, we characterize the 
spells in the databases just as they are, without any statistical treatment to 
account for censoring. While this is obviously a limitation of the analysis, we 
think it is convenient to look first at the raw data as it comes.15  
Due to the different lengths of the windows of observation, the maximum 
duration that can be observed in our databases are 90, 288 and 105 months in 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, respectively. Because of this, we will not push 
                                                 
14 We consider a public worker to be anyone who worked in the public sector at least half of the 
total time during which contributions were made. According to this criterion, we identify 58,617 
(85 percent) as private and 10,380 (15 percent) as public sector workers in the database. 
15 Provided with this characterization, in a companion paper we estimate duration models that 
explicitly account for censoring.  
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the comparative perspective so much in our characterization of spell durations 
as we did regarding densities. 
Table 5 and Table 6 summarize statistics on the duration of the spells of 
contributing and not contributing to the Argentinean SIJP. The spells last on 
average only 12 months. There are no large differences between sexes, regime 
(PAYG/capitalization), or type of worker (employed, self-employed). In turn, 
the duration of the spells of contribution (lack of contribution) consistently 
increase (decrease) with income level. The distribution of the spells duration is 
strongly skewed to the right: the median is much smaller than the mean 
duration. While the average duration was 12 both for the spells of contribution 
and no contribution, the median duration of the spells of contribution in the 
whole population was only six months, and the median duration of the spells of 
no contribution was only seven months. About 40 percent of the spells of both 
contributing and not contributing lasted less than six months. In summary, most 
contributors to the Argentinean SIJP show frequent interruptions in their 
contribution status.  
In the Chilean sample, the spells of contribution last on average 28.3 months 
while the spells of no contribution last on average 22.7 months (Table 7 and 
Table 8).16   
Spell durations show much diversity across individuals in Chile. Spells of 
contribution among men and women are very similar in duration, yet women 
show longer spells of no contribution. This is, once again, probably associated 
with Chilean women withdrawing from the formal labor force to care for 
children. Like in Argentina, the distribution of contribution spells is highly 
skewed to the right, with the median being only seven months. This large 
difference can only be explained by a small number of long spells (21 percent 
exceed 36 months). The average duration consistently increases with income 
level (ranging from 16.7 months in the first quintile to 54.1 months in the upper 
quintile). Unlike in Argentina, and rather surprisingly, the average and median 
spells of no contribution remain relatively constant between the second and the 
richest quintile. About 43 percent of the spells of contribution and 37 percent of 
the spells of no contribution lasted less than six months.  
                                                 
16 To construct these measures, care was given to avoid false interruptions in contribution spells, 
which usually originated in delayed payment on the part of employers. Contribution gaps smaller 
than two months were in most cases corrected in the data. 
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Table 9 and Table 10 summarize the information about the duration of the 
spells of contribution and no contribution in the Uruguayan sample. On 
average, the spells of contribution last 33 months and the spells of no 
contribution last 20 months. Women have longer spells of contribution on 
average than men, but they also have longer spells of no contribution. 
Therefore, men seem to have higher turnover than women in Uruguay. Public 
sector workers have much longer spells of contribution and shorter spells of no 
contribution than private sector workers. 
Like in Argentina and Chile, the distribution of duration is skewed to the 
right in the Uruguayan social security system. For contribution, the median 
duration is only 13 months (while the mean is 33) and for no contribution, it is 
10 (while the mean is 20). About one third of all spells of contribution and no 
contribution lasted less than six months. 
C. Transitions 
We present in Figure 4 the average transition rates by age in the three 
countries. The transition rates out of contributing peak at early ages. Workers 
below 20 have monthly probabilities of leaving the state contributing as high as 
15 percent in Argentina and about 10 percent in Chile and Uruguay.17 In all 
cases, these probabilities decrease with age and reach minimums at around 40 
years of age.  This decline of the probabilities of stopping contributions with 
age is to be expected, since young individuals tend to change jobs and spend 
time out of the labor market more often than mature individuals.   
In some but not in all cases, the transition rates out of contributing rise at 
advanced ages. This pattern would be the expected one if death and retirement 
were computed as transitions out of contributing, but not if these events were 
treated as censored observations. Since our goal was to characterize workers 
contribution behavior conditional on not retiring and not dying, we did not 
compute a transition when we observed that a worker died or retired. In this 
view, it is not so clear why transition rates out of contributing rise at these ages. 
One possible explanation is that we could not always identify retirement or 
even death.  It is worth noticing also that the number of observations is 
comparatively low at advanced ages, so the error is higher.  
                                                 
17 Uruguayan public employees show higher transition rates, but these figures should be taken 
with caution for the number of public employees in these ages is very small. 
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The transition rates out of contributing are strikingly high in Argentina. At 
no age, the average transition rates fall below 5 percent per month among men 
and only at 68 it falls below 4 percent per month among women. The rates of 
transition out of contributing tend to be smaller in Uruguay than in Argentina 
and Chile. As expected, the transition rates out of public employment in 
Uruguay are particularly low, but they are also low in the private sector 
compared to the rates we found in Argentina and Chile.  
The average transition rates out of not contributing do not show the same 
age patterns across countries. Argentinean workers aged between 18 and 55 
years have probabilities of making a transition from not contributing to 
contributing in the order of 5 percent per month. These probabilities fall at 
more advanced ages. Chilean workers show maximum transition rates out of 
not contributing at 20. At this age, the probability that a Chilean worker starts 
contributing in any month is about 7 to 8 percent for men and about 5 percent 
for women. The transition rates fall at higher ages. Uruguayan workers also 
show maximum transition rates out of not contributing at around 20 in the 
private sector and a bit later in the public sector. The maximum average 
transition rates out of not contributing by age are close to 5 percent per month 
in Uruguay.  
V. Concluding Remarks  
The picture that emerges from our study is worrisome. In the three 
countries, the density of contributions is low on average and pretty 
heterogeneous across the population. In the periods covered by our study, 
working-age Chileans registered in the social security system contributed about 
half of the time, and Argentineans and Uruguayans a bit more (55 and 60%, 
respectively). With these densities, the expected number of years of 
contribution that the average worker would have accumulated at 60, if he had 
started working at 18, would be between 22 years in Chile and 25 years in 
Uruguay (with Argentina in between).  
What is worst, low income workers tend to have particularly low densities 
of contribution, so their probability of fulfilling pension eligibility conditions, 
and the expected benefits if they do, are bound to be very low. Densities in the 
poorest quintile range between 35 percent in Chile to around 45 percent in 
Argentina and Uruguay.  
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Average densities are not too different between men and women in 
Argentina and Uruguay, but Chilean women show much smaller densities than 
Chilean men.  
In the periods spanned by our databases -1994 to 2001 in Argentina, 1981 to 
2006 in Chile, and 1996 to 2004 in Uruguay-, we observe a steady 
improvement in Chile and deteriorations in Argentina and Uruguay. In the 
three countries, contribution densities fluctuated along the business cycle and it 
is not clear to what extent the decline in densities observed in Argentina and 
Uruguay respond to a temporary phenomenon.  
In the three countries, the spells of contribution exhibit frequent 
interruptions. On average, the spells of contribution lasted only 12 months in 
Argentina, 28 months in Chile and 33 months in Uruguay. Low income 
workers tend to have more frequent interruptions. Transition rates out of 
contributing are high at early ages and tend to reach a minimum at about 40 
years old. Transition rates out of not contributing peak at early ages and then 
tends to decline. Argentina shows strikingly high transition rates, which is 
consistent with the short spells of contribution.  
In sum, the three countries present low densities of contribution, frequent 
interruptions and short durations. Densities are particularly low and 
interruptions are particularly frequent among low income workers. We are not 
aware of similar studies for other Latin American countries, but taking into 
account that Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are among the countries with higher 
social security coverage, we expect other countries in the region to have even 
lower densities. What is less obvious is whether these lower densities are also 
associated with shorter spells of contribution, i.e. with more frequent 
interruptions.  
The macroeconomic performance of the three countries has been improving 
in recent years. The rates of unemployment have been decreasing and there are 
signs of increasing formalization. Also in recent years, social security 
administrations and governments have made efforts to increase coverage. 
These macro trends suggest that the social security indicators we analyze are 
likely to have improved after the period covered in our study. Unfortunately, 
we do not have data in the three countries to extend our comparative analysis to 
include more recent periods. In any event, we think the analysis we present is 
relevant for at least three reasons. First, the performance of social security 
programs and, in particular, the acquisition of pension rights hinge on 
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contributions made over long periods. So the low densities and frequent 
interruptions observed in the periods we could analyze will have a bearing on 
acquired pension rights for a considerable while. Second, informality is a 
structural phenomenon so we expect considerable inertia. Finally, our analysis 
suggests that these indicators should be closely scrutinized to see whether the 
issues we raise are less pressing today –and in the near future– than they were 
in the periods we could study. Social security administrations have the data 
needed to continue this study, but only the Chilean Superintendence has made 
recent samples of their administrative records publicly available. 
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Figure 1 
Coverage of the Labor Force in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay 
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Source:  Authors’ computations based on Rofman et al. (2008b). 
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Figure 2 
Distribution of the Density of Contributions  
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Figure 2 
Distribution of the Density of Contributions (cont.) 
 
Notes: Contributions to the Argentinean SIJP between July 1994 and December 2001, the 
Chilean AFP program between 1981 and 2004 and the Uruguayan BPS between April 1996 and 
December 2004.  
Source: Authors’ computations based on the work history records of social security. 
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Figure 3 
Evolution of contribution densities and rates of unemployment 
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Figure 3 
Evolution of contribution densities and rates of unemployment (cont.) 
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Source: Authors’ computations 
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Figure 4 
Transition rates 
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Figure 4 
Transition rates (cont.) 
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Notes: Contributions to the Argentinean SIJP between July 1994 and December 2001, the 
Chilean AFP program between 1981 and 2004 and the Uruguayan BPS between April 1996 and 
December 2004.  
Source: Authors’ computations 
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Table 1 
Aggregate Pension Statistics in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay (2006) 
 Argentina Chile Uruguay 
Spending on Pensions as % of GDP A 6.4 3.1 10.8 
Elderly population (% of population 
over 65) 9.9 8.1 13.4 
Average Pension (% of per Capita 
GDP) 52.8 33.8 44.0 
Coverage of Elderly (as % of 
Population Aged 65+) B 70.5  75.5 85.6 
Coverage of Labor Force (%) 39.2 62.7 60.9 
Notes: A Contributory old-age pensions: Uruguay includes old-age, survival and disability; 
Chilean calculations include contributory pensions (old-age, disability and survivorship) paid 
from both the PAYG and the AFP systems; B Argentinean coverage may have increased after the 
Pension Inclusion Program implemented by the government in 2007. 
Source:  Authors’ computations based on (i) Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Uruguay; (ii) 
Rofman et al. (2008b); (iii) Ministerio de Economía y Producción de la Argentina; and, (iv) 
statistics for Chile from www.spensiones.cl, Chilean Central Bank and www.inp.cl. Population 
ratios were calculated from the 2001, 2002 and 2004 decennial census in Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Densities of contribution by sex 
 Argentina Chile Uruguay 
Mean densities 
   Men 55.0 57.9 62.4 
   Women  56.9 43.0 64.2 
   Total 55.9 51.4 60.2 
Median densities 
   Men 55.6 61.3 69.5 
   Women  61.2 39.2 73.3 
   Total 56.7 52.2 65.7 
 
Notes: Contributions to the Argentinean SIJP between July 1994 and December 2001, the 
Chilean AFP program between 1981 and 2006 and the Uruguayan BPS between April 1996 and 
December 2004. 
Source: Authors’ computations based on the work history records of social security. 
 
 
Table 3 
Contribution densities by age 
Age Argentina Chile Uruguay 
20 34.7 29.9 39.1 
35 69.2 55.3 67.6 
50 68.0 63.6 73.8 
Notes: Contributions to the Argentinean SIJP between July 1994 and December 2001, the 
Chilean AFP program between 1981 and 2006 and the Uruguayan BPS between April 1996 and 
December 2004. 
Source: Authors’ computations based on the work history records of social security 
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Table 4 
Contribution densities by income level 
 Argentina Chile  Uruguay 
Poorest Quintile 44.1 34.9 46.6 
2nd Quintile 51.4 46.3 59.5 
3rd Quintile 54.5 52.2 64.1 
4th Quintile 58.6 59.8 68.6 
Richest Quintile 67.7 64.9 73.3 
 
Notes: Contributions to the Argentinean SIJP between July 1994 and December 2001, the 
Chilean AFP program between 1981 and 2006 and the Uruguayan BPS between April 1996 and 
December 2004. 
Source: Authors’ computations based on the work history records of social security. 
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Table 5 
Argentina. Duration of Spells of Contribution in Sample, July 1994 to 
December 2001 
Characteristics Mean Median 
Percentage of Spells in Sample with Durations... 
< 6  
Months 
6-12 
Months 
12-24 
Months 
24-36 
Months 
>36 
Months 
Total 11.8 6 43.8 23.6 16.4 6.8 9.5 
Sex 
Men 11.6 6 44.9 23.3 16.0 6.5 9.5 
Women 12.3 7 40.8 24.4 17.5 7.8 9.5 
Regime 
PAYG 11.3 6 45.8 23.3 15.9 6.3 8.8 
Capitalization 13.8 8 35.1 24.9 18.7 9.1 12.3 
Type of Worker 
Employed 13.1 7 39.0 25.0 17.1 7.3 11.6 
Self-Employed 11.9 7 42.5 21.9 19.1 8.2 8.3 
NA 6.0 3 66.5 18.8 10.5 3.0 1.3 
Income Bracket   
Poorest Quintile 8.4 5 55.2 22.6 13.5 5.0 3.8 
2nd Quintile 10.9 6 45.0 23.6 18.0 7.0 6.4 
3rd Quintile 13.0 8 37.4 24.6 19.6 8.3 10.2 
4th Quintile 14.9 8 32.5 26.0 18.4 8.8 14.4 
Richest Quintile 18.8 12 22.8 26.2 18.7 9.1 23.2 
Note:  The sample window is 90 months. Only spells within the observation window were 
computed. Each income bracket includes the minimum of the interval. 
Source:  Authors’ computations 
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Table 6 
Argentina. Duration of Spells of No Contribution in Sample, July 1994 to 
December 2001 
Characteristics Mean Median 
Percentage of Spells in Sample with Durations... 
< 6  
Months 
6-12 
Months 
12-24 
Months 
24-36 
Months 
>36 
Months 
Total 12.4 7 39.5 22.5 20.6 9.4 8.1 
Sex 
Men 12.2 7 40.0 22.7 20.7 9.2 7.6 
Women 13.1 8 38.7 21.8 20.2 10.0 9.3 
Regime 
PAYG 12.3 7 39.2 22.7 20.9 9.4 7.8 
Capitalization 13.1 7 41.1 21.1 18.9 9.2 9.8 
Type of Worker 
Employed 9.8 6 46.6 22.7 19.4 7.1 4.1 
Self-Employed 9.9 6 45.2 23.2 20.1 7.8 3.7 
NA 23.0 20 11.5 20.9 24.6 18.3 25.0 
Income Bracket   
Poorest Quintile 11.3 7 39.5 24.0 22.5 8.7 5.4 
2nd Quintile 10.2 6 43.3 24.4 20.4 8.2 3.8 
3rd Quintile 10.1 6 45.0 23.1 19.8 8.0 4.1 
4th Quintile 8.9 5 51.1 22.0 17.8 5.8 3.4 
Richest Quintile 7.2 4 60.5 18.8 14.3 4.1 2.4 
 
Note: The sample window is 90 months. Only spells within the observation window were 
computed. Each income bracket includes the minimum of the interval. 
Source:  Authors’ computations 
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Table 7 
Chile. Duration of Spells of Contribution in Sample, 1981 to 2006 
Characteristic
s 
 
Mean Median 
Percentage of Spells in Sample with Durations... 
< 6 
Month
s 
6-12 
Months 
12-24 
Months 
24-36 
Months 
>36 
Months 
Total 28.3 7.0 42.6 17.3 12.8 6.3 21.0 
Sex 
Men 28.4 8.0 42.0 17.4 13.4 6.4 20.8 
Women 28.0 7.0 43.7 17.2 11.7 6.1 21.3 
Income Bracket 
Poorest 
Quintile 16.7 5.0 54.0 18.3 11.4 4.8 11.4 
2nd Quintile 21.6 7.0 43.3 19.3 14.0 6.8 16.6 
3rd Quintile 25.7 8.0 40.7 18.3 14.0 7.0 20.0 
4th Quintile 35.7 10.0 36.2 16.0 13.3 6.9 27.6 
Richest 
Quintile 54.1 15.0 33.5 12.2 10.4 6.2 37.6 
 
Note:  The sample window is 288 months. Only spells within the observation window were 
computed. Each income bracket includes the minimum of the interval. 
Source:  Authors’ computations. 
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Table 8 
Chile. Duration of Spells of No Contribution in Sample, 1981 to 2006 
Characteristic
s Mean Median 
Percentage of Spells in Sample with Durations... 
<6 
Months 
6-12 
Months 
12-24 
Months 
24-36 
Months 
>36 
Months 
Total 22.7 8.0 36.8 23.3 14.3 7.4 18.1 
Sex 
Men 17.8 7.0 40.8 24.2 14.6 7.1 13.3 
Women 30.6 11.0 30.4 22.0 13.9 7.9 25.9 
Income Bracket 
Poorest 
Quintile 27.1 10.0 30.6 24.2 15.7 8.0 21.5 
2nd Quintile 22.5 8.0 36.5 24.0 14.0 7.8 17.8 
3rd Quintile 20.7 8.0 38.4 24.1 14.4 7.0 16.1 
4th Quintile 20.4 8.0 40.2 22.3 14.2 7.2 16.1 
Richest 
Quintile 21.7 8.0 41.0 20.9 12.9 6.6 18.7 
 
Note:  The sample window is 288 months. Only spells within the observation window were 
computed. Each income bracket includes the minimum of the interval. 
Source:  Authors’ computation 
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Table 9 
Uruguay. Duration of Spells of Contribution in BPS Sample, April 1996 to 
December 2004 
Characteristics Mean Median 
Percentage of Spells in Sample with Durations... 
<6  
Months 
6-12 
Months 
12-24 
Months 
24-36 
Months 
>36 
Months 
Total 33.2 13 31.5 15.3 13.0 6.8 32.8 
Sex 
Men 31.4 12 33.5 15.7 13.0 6.5 30.7 
Women 35.7 16 28.6 14.7 13.0 7.2 35.8 
Sector        
Public 67.8 96 11.7 7.6 7.0 3.4 67.9 
Private 29.1 11 33.8 16.2 13.7 7.2 28.7 
Income Bracket 
Poorest Quintile 24.4 8 42.6 15.8 12.1 5.8 23.2 
2nd Quintile 30.4 13 30.7 17.0 14.8 7.8 29.2 
3rd Quintile 31.8 14 28.9 17.1 14.9 7.4 31.2 
4th Quintile 35.3 17 27.2 15.3 13.7 7.5 35.6 
Richest Quintile 46.8 30 27.4 10.1 8.6 4.9 47.9 
 
Note:  The sample window is 105 months. Only spells within the observation window were 
computed. Each income bracket includes the minimum of the interval. 
Source:  Authors’ computations. 
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Table 10 
Uruguay. Duration of Spells of No Contribution in BPS Sample, April 
1996 to December 2004 
 
Characteristics Mean Median 
Percentage of Spells in Sample with Durations... 
<6  
Months 
6-12 
Months 
12-24 
Months 
24-36 
Months 
>36 
Months 
Total 17.6 7.0 45.6 16.7 12.9 7.8 17.3 
Sex 
Men 14.7 5.0 53.5 14.9 11.6 6.8 13.4 
Women 22.9 11.0 30.8 19.9 15.3 9.7 24.6 
Sector 
Public 15.7 6.0 47.0 19.9 12.2 7.7 14.1 
Private 17.7 7.0 45.5 16.5 12.9 7.8 17.4 
Income Bracket 
Poorest Quintile 21.5 9.0 40.9 15.0 13.0 8.3 23.0 
2nd Quintile 17.8 7.0 44.1 16.5 14.1 8.1 17.4 
3rd Quintile 15.4 6.0 49.5 16.3 12.7 7.5 14.2 
4th Quintile 15.1 5.0 50.4 16.7 12.1 7.4 13.7 
Richest Quintile 17.7 8.0 42.4 21.0 12.0 7.8 17.3 
 
Note:  The sample window is 105 months. Only spells within the observation window were 
computed. Each income bracket includes the minimum of the interval. 
Source:  Authors’ computations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
